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Note

NOTE
State v. Roberts: A PERSUASIVE BUT UNSUPPORTED
POSITION

T

in State v. Roberts' that when a
witness is unavailable at the trial of a criminal defendant, the state may
not introduce the witness' preliminary hearing testimony into evidence unless
he had been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing. 2 The court found that
the defendant, Roberts, had been denied his right to confront an adverse
witness when the trial court admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of a
witness who was not present at trial,3 and held that mere opportunity to crossexamine at a preliminary hearing, unexercised, did not satisfy the demands of
4
the Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment.
HE OHIO SUPREME COURT RECENTLY HELD

I.

THE DECISION IN

State v. Roberts

In January, 1975, Herschel Roberts appeared in the Mentor, Ohio
municipal court and was charged with several counts of forgery and receiving
stolen property. The prosecution alleged that Roberts had stolen and used
credit cards belonging to Bernard and Amy Isaacs. At a preliminary hearing,
Roberts' defense counsel called Anita Isaacs, the daughter of the alleged
victims, as a witness and attempted to elicit testimony that she knew the
defendant and had given him permission to use her parents' cards. While
Anita admitted that she knew the defendant and occasionally allowed him to
use her apartment, she denied giving him permission to use the credit cards.
Despite this damaging testimony, defense counsel did not request that she be
declared a hostile witness, 5 and therefore did not subject her to crossexamination. At the conclusion of the preliminary bearing, the judge found
that probable cause existed and ordered Roberts bound over to the common
pleas court. Roberts was subsequently indicted for receiving stolen property,
forgery and possession of heroin.
55 Ohio St. 2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1990 (1979).
Although preliminary hearing testimony may be classified as hearsay evidence, the Ohio
legislature has provided an exception to the hearsay rule:
Testimony taken at an examination or a preliminary hearing at which the defendant is
present, or at a former trial of the cause, or taken by deposition at the instance of the
defendant or the state, may be used whenever the witness giving such testimony dies, or
cannot for any reason be produced at trial, or whenever the witness has, since giving
such testimony, become incapacitated to testify. If such former testimony is contained
within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated transcript of such testimony, it shall be
proven by the . . . transcript.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (Page 1975). See also FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1).

3 55 Ohio St. 2d at 197, 378 N.E.2d at 496.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. . . ; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." (emphasis added).
' A trial judge has discretionary power to declare a witness hostile. See State v. Parrott, 27
Ohio St. 2d 205, 211, 272 N.E.2d 112, 116 (1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972).
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At trial,6 the prosecution was unable to produce Anita Isaacs as a witness.
Although the State had issued five subpoenas for Anita to her parents' address,
she failed to appear in court on the day of trial. Accordingly, the prosecution
moved to have her declared unavailable as a witness and to admit her
preliminary hearing testimony into evidence.7 At a hearing on the motion,
Anita's mother was questioned by both the prosecution and defense about her
daughter's whereabouts.8 The trial court was satisfied that Anita was actually
unavailable and admitted her preliminary hearing testimony over the
objection of defense counsel. At the trial's conclusion, Roberts was convicted
on all counts.
Roberts appealed the verdict, and his conviction was reversed. The Lake
County Court of Appeals held that the admission of Anita Isaacs' preliminary
hearing testimony into evidence had violated Roberts' sixth amendment right
to confront adverse witnesses because the State had made insufficient efforts
to produce the witness. 9 On appeal by the State, the Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals decision on different grounds. The court held
that Anita Isaacs was properly classified as an unavailable witness because the
State had met its burden of showing a diligent effort to produce her. 10
Nevertheless, the court held that Roberts' sixth amendment rights had been
violated because Anita Isaacs had not been actually cross-examined at the
preliminary hearing. The majority concluded that the mere opportunity to
cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing did not satisfy the demands
of the sixth amendment where recorded testimony from the hearing was later
admitted at trial because of witness unavailability."
In explaining the result, the court noted the inherent differences in defense
counsel strategy for cross-examining witnesses at preliminary hearings and at
trial.' 2 These variances developed to a great extent because different burdens
of proof are placed upon the prosecution at each proceeding. At preliminary
hearings, the State is required only to show probable cause for the belief that
the defendant committed the crime with which he is charged.' 3 Because the
State often establishes probable cause without difficulty, defense attorneys
are often unwilling to engage in extensive cross-examinations when they have
6 Roberts' trial did not take place until March, 1976. During the interim, he was compelled to
retain new counsel to replace the attorney who had represented him in the preliminary hearing,
for his first lawyer was elected to a municipal judgeship. 55 Ohio St. 2d at 192,378 N.E.2d at 494.
1 The prosecution based its motion on OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (Page 1975). See note 2

supra.
8 Mrs. Isaacs testified that she had spoken with her daughter in early 1975 after learning that
she had applied for welfare in California. During the summer of 1975, Anita had telephoned and
indicated that she would be traveling outside of Ohio. Mrs. Isaacs had not heard from her
daughter since that time. 55 Ohio St. 2d at 192, 378 N.E.2d at 494.
1 55 Ohio St. 2d at 193,378 N.E.2d at 494. The court of appeals based its decision on Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
1055 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 378 N.E.2d at 495-96.
1 Id. at 196, 378 N.E.2d at 496.
12

Id.

See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5(B)(4) ("Upon conclusion of all the evidence ... the court [at a
preliminary hearing] shall do one of the following: (a) Find that there is probable cause to believe
the crime alleged or another felony has been committed . . . (b) Find that there is probable
cause to believe that a misdemeanor was committed . . .").
13

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss3/5

2

STATE v. ROBERTS

19781

little hope of defeating the State's case and, instead, might unnecessarily
14
expose elements of defense strategy to the prosecution in advance of trial. In
contrast, at trial the State must establish a defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.'5 Accordingly, defense attorneys are likely to conduct
extensive cross-examinations of adverse witnesses whenever there is any hope
of raising reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.
Due to these considerations, the Ohio Supreme Court implied that a
nonexercise of the right to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing should not
6
be construed as a waiver of that right at trial.' The court held that the
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness may be introduced
into evidence at trial only if the witness had been cross-examined at the
preliminary hearing.' 7 An unexercised opportunity to cross-examine, in the
court's analysis, simply did not satisfy constitutional guarantees.
II.

PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The sixth amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.'" Secondarily, the
amendment affords triers of fact opportunities to evaluate the demeanor of
such witnesses. 9 The first major treatment of the sixth amendment's
Confrontation Clause was undertaken by the United States Supreme Court in
the 1895 decision of Mattox v. United States.'0 Application of the
Confrontation Clause was considerably broadened in 1965 when the Supreme
Court, in Pointer v. Texas, 21 held for the first time that its provisions were
applicable, through the fourteenth amendment, to state criminal
" See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 195 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Virgin Islands v.
Aquino, 378 F.2d 540,549 (3d Cir. 1967) ("The fear of adding to government's case by extensive
cross-examination weighs heavily on a defendant's counsel at a preliminary hearing..."); but see
Havey v. Kropp, 458 F.2d 1054 (6th Cir. 1972) (acknowledging the different burdens at each
proceeding but holding that no error had occurred because of a statute providing notice to
counsel that the preliminary hearing testimony would be admissible at trial). The Havey decision
was recognized as the prevailing interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the sixth circuit in
Glenn v. Dallman, No. C-1-78-289 (S.D. Ohio, January 19, 1979), where the court was bound
to follow the federal court interpretation of the Constitution in Havey and thus was forced to
reverse its earlier decision which adhered to the Ohio position found in Roberts.
15 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. §2901.05 (Page Supp. 1978) ("Every person accused of an offense
is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . .").
16 55 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 378 N.E.2d at 496-97; see notes 62-66 infra and accompanying text.
'7
18

55 Ohio St. 2d at 196-97, 378 N.E.2d at 496.
Id. at 194, 378 N.E.2d at 495.

'0 The dual purposes of the Confrontation Clause were explained by the United States
Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895):
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43.

20

156 U.S. 237 (1895).
U.S. 400 (1965).

21 380
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proceedings.2 2 In Pointer, the Court determined that the petitioner's sixth
amendment rights were violated when the preliminary hearing testimony of a
key witness, who was unavailable to testify at trial, was admitted into
evidence.23 At the preliminary hearing, Pointer had not been represented by
counsel and had made no effort to cross-examine the witness. While the Court
did not decide whether the State's failure to provide Pointer with an attorney
at the preliminary hearing was violative of the fourteenth amendment,24 it did
find that the absence of counsel at the hearing and the subsequent
unavailability of the witness at trial combined to deny Pointer his right to
confront an adverse witness.2 5 The Court suggested, however, that a different
holding would have emerged if Pointer had been represented at his
preliminary hearing by an attorney who had been given a "complete and
26
adequate opportunity to cross-examine" the witness.
Three years later, in Barberv. Page,2 7 the Supreme Court made a second
major pronouncement on the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony
and the application of the Confrontation Clause to state criminal proceedings.
In Barber, as in Pointer, a state trial court had admitted into evidence the
preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness whom the prosecution had
asserted was unavailable to testify at trial. 28 The Court found that the witness
was not actually unavailable because the prosecution had failed to make a
good faith effort to secure the presence of the adverse witness at trial. 29 This
determination led the Court to conclude that the introduction into evidence of
the adverse witness' preliminary hearing testimony had deprived Barber of
30
his sixth amendment right of confrontation.
Unlike the petitioner in Pointer,Barber had been represented by counsel
at his preliminary hearing. 3' This led the State to contend that Barber had
waived his right to confront by failing to engage in cross-examination at his
22 The Court previously held that the Confrontation Clause was not applicable to the states.
See Westv. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); see generally Graham, The Right of Confrontationand
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CPm4. L. BULL. 99 (1972).
23 380 U.S. at 406. The alleged robbery victim, Kenneth Phillips, had moved out of the state by
the time of trial. He had testified against the petitioner at the preliminary hearing. ld. at 401.
24 The Court in Pointerspecifically reserved the issue of whether a failure to provide counsel
at preliminary hearings is violative of a defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 403. That question
was ultimately resolved in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), where the Court found that a
preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" in the state's criminal procedure and required that an
indigent be represented by counsel at that point.
25 380 U.S. at 406.
26 "The case before us would be quite a different one had Phillips' statement been taken at a
full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a
complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine." Id. (emphasis added).
27 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
28 The prosecution had not attempted to compel attendance of the witness at trial because he
was incarcerated outside the trial court's jurisdiction in the federal prison of an adjacent state. Id.
at 723.
29 The Court stated that increased cooperation between state and federal authorities and the
enactment in forty-nine states of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings made it likely that the witness could have been produced
at trial. Id. at 723 n.4.
30Id. at 724-25. Justice Harlan, however, thought the constitutional infirmity in Barber's
conviction was a due process violation. Id. at 726.
31 Id. at 720.
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preliminary hearing. 32 The Court, however, dismissed this argument as
"untenable," and found that "no intelligent relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege" had been made, particularly in light of the
defendant's legitimate expectation that the State would make a good faith
effort to produce the adverse witness at trial. 33 Supplementing its response to
the State's waiver argument, the Court noted that the sixth amendment would
not have been satisfied even if the adverse witness had actually been crossexamined at the preliminary hearing. 34 As in Pointer,the Court concluded
with the dictum that an opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing
might meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause if actual
35
unavailability could be established at trial.
Thus, while in Pointer the Supreme Court broadly considered the
relationship between an inadequate opportunity to confront an adverse
witness at a preliminary hearing and that witness' subsequent unavailability at
trial as combining to create a sixth amendment violation, the Court in Barber
more narrowly focused on the factual issue of witness unavailability itself as it
related to a defendant's sixth amendment rights. Barber,in effect, stressed the
proposition that the right to confront adverse witnesses was, in the first
instance, a trial right, and that only a showing of necessity, as when a witness is
unavailable, would induce the Court to consider whether the right might have
been satisfied in another proceeding, such as a preliminary hearing. Barber
also found untenable the proffered argument that failure to cross-examine at a
preliminary hearing constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation.
Neither the Barber nor Pointer Courts considered the specific circumstances in which the right to confront witnesses might be satisfied at a
proceeding other than a trial. These important considerations were
subsequently addressed by the Supreme Court in Californiav. Green.36 A
prosecution witness, Porter, had testified favorably for the prosecution at a
preliminary hearing. At trial, he became forgetful and evasive. To prove its
case, the prosecution was permitted to introduce portions from the transcript
of Porter's preliminary hearing testimony into evidence under section 1235 of
the California Evidence Code, which permitted the use of preliminary
hearing testimony at trial whenever that testimony was inconsistent with a
witness' trial testimony. 37 Although the defendant's attorney conducted a
32

Id. at 725.

33Id. The Barber Court adopted the standard used in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),

for determining whether a waiver of rights was effected. The Zerbst decision held that a waiver
was "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" and further
stated that the determination of whether a waiver existed would depend on the particular facts
surrounding the case. 304 U.S. at 464.
34390 U.S. at 725.
3- Id. at 725-26 (dictum).
36 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
31Section 1235 provides in part: "Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing
and is offered in compliance with section 770." CAL. Evm. CODE § 1235 (1966). Section 770
provides:
Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a statement made
by a witness that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be
excluded unless:
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cross-examination of Porter's "refreshed" memory, the defendant was
convicted. Ultimately the California Supreme Court analyzed section 1235
and held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated a defendant's
to
right to confront adverse witnesses, even if the witness had been subjected
38
cross-examination by defense counsel at the preliminary hearing.
The Supreme Court reversed the California decision and held, on
alternative grounds, that section 1235 of the California Evidence Code had
not deprived Green of his right to confront adverse witnesses.3 9 The Court
first observed that the operative circumstances which gave rise to the
introduction of preliminary hearing testimony at trial under the evidentiary
rule negated any assertion that the defendant had been denied his right to
confront an adverse witness. By its terms, section 1235 permitted use of a
witness' preliminary hearing testimony at trial only where the witness actually
appeared at trial and gave inconsistent testimony.40 Therefore, a defendant
would necessarily receive the opportunity at trial to confront the witness as to
the preliminary hearing testimony, and the trier of fact would be afforded an
opportunity to evaluate the demeanor of the witness as he attempted to
explain the inconsistent testimony. Thus, the Court concluded that the strict
requirements of the Confrontation Clause had been fully satisfied at Green's
41
trial.
On its second line of reasoning, the Court further noted that its decision
would have been the same even if Porter had been actually unavailable at
trial. 42 In so reasoning, the Court relied upon the important dicta in Pointer
and Barber,43 and set standards for evaluating compliance with the
Confrontation Clause where a necessity prevents the State from affording a
criminal defendant an opportunity at trial to cross-examine an adverse
witness. In determining that preliminary hearing testimony might constitutionally be admitted into evidence when a defendant was unable to
exercise his right to cross-examine the adverse witness at trial, the Court
observed that the determinative issue was whether the preliminary hearing
testimony "had . . .been given under circumstances closely approximating
those that surround the typical trial."44 The Court explained that such
circumstances included: (1) whether testimony was given under oath; (2)
whether the defendant was represented by counsel; (3) whether the
defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the time the
testimony was taken; and (4) whether the proceedings were conducted
45
before a judicial tribunal equipped to provide a record of the hearing.
(a) the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to
explain or deny the statement;
or
(b) the witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the
action.

Id. § 770.
3'People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 442 (1969).
39399 U.S. at 153.
40See note 37 supra.
11399 U.S. at 164.
42 Id. at 165.
43See notes 26 and 35 supra and accompanying text.
44399 U.S. at 165.
45 Id.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss3/5
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These standards may be viewed by state courts as unpersuasive, both
because they were formulated to resolve an issue which was not necessary to
the Green decision, and because the standards do not completely fit the facts
in Green. For example, not only was there an opportunity to cross-examine
the adverse witness at the preliminary hearing, Green's counsel actually did
cross-examine him. 46 Nevertheless, Green represents the most extensive
pronouncement by the Supreme Court in this area of the law, and it clearly
indicates a preference by the Court to admit preliminary hearing testimony in
evidence at trial where the testimony has been received under circumstances
promoting its claim to reliability
and protecting defendant's right to confront
47
the merits of the testimony.
III.

Roberts -

A

PROBLEMATIC MAJORITY OPINION

The Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts affirmed the decision of the Lake
County Court of Appeals reversing Roberts' conviction, but on different
grounds.4 8 While the court of appeals centered its decision on a perceived49
failure by the State to meet the "witness unavailability" standard of Barber,
the Ohio Supreme Court instead found that the State had met its burden of
establishing unavailability. Nevertheless, it held that Roberts had been denied
his right to confront an adverse witness, since Anita Isaacs, the unavailable
witness whose written testimony had been admitted into evidence at trial, had
not been actually cross-examined at the preliminary hearing where her
50
testimony had been taken.
Chief Justice O'Neill began his majority opinion5 ' in Roberts by
recognizing that the requirements of the sixth amendment's Confrontation
Clause have been applicable in state criminal proceedings since Pointer v.
Texas.51 The court then noted that the primary purpose of the Clause has been
3
to guarantee an accused the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Most
importantly, the court articulated a two-pronged test for determining
whether prior recorded testimony of a witness can be introduced at trial
without defeating the primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause.
According to the court, prior recorded testimony may be introduced only if
(1) the testimony was taken "in judicial proceeding concerning substantially
the same issues" and (2) the witness was subject to cross-examination by the
54
defendant in the initial proceeding.
46 Id. at 151.

4 Id. at 165.
4 55 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 378 N.E.2d at 496; see notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
1955 Ohio St. 2d at 193, 378 N.E.2d at 494.
50 Id.

51Chief Justice O'Neill drafted the majority opinion and was joined by Justices William B.
Brown, Paul W. Brown, and Sweeney. Justice Celebreeze issued a dissenting opinion joined by
Justices Herbert and Lochner.
52 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
' 55 Ohio St. 2d at 194, 378 N.E.2d at 495. The court also indicated that the Confrontation
Clause has a secondary purpose. It affords the trier of fact an opportunity to observe witness
demeanor. Id.
54Id. at 194,378 N.E.2d at496. The court based its
test on Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
and on 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (Chadbourne rev. 1974). The court's reliance on
(1895),
Published
by
EngagedScholarship@CSU,
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these authorities is arguably misplaced. The Mattox Court did not consider whether "identity of
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When this test was applied to the case at bar, the court observed that, while
the basic factual issue as to whether the defendant had in fact stolen the credit
cards had been the same at trial and at the preliminary hearing, the ultimate
factual issues were not identical.5 5 The court noted that the ultimate factual
issue at the preliminary hearing was "whether there was probable cause to
believe that a crime had been committed and that the defendant had
committed it."5 6 On the other hand, the ultimate issue at trial was proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed each element
57
of the crime.
Under this reasoning, the court could have concluded that preliminary
hearing testimony may never be used at trial without violating the
Confrontation Clause because the ultimate factual issues are never the same at
both proceedings. However, this general prohibition against use of prior
testimony was not adopted. Instead, the majority correlated the distinction
between the ultimate factual issues at trials and preliminary hearings to the
second requirement of its test for admissibility, i.e., that the testimony be
given by a witness who was subject to cross-examination by the defendant.5 8
As previously noted, the court observed that this difference in ultimate factual
issues restricted the scope of cross-examination by prudent defense attorneys
at preliminary hearings.5 9 It stated that, because of the lower burden of proof
imposed on the prosecution at a preliminary hearing, cautious defense
attorneys were not likely to undertake extensive cross-examinations and risk
exposure of major weaknesses in their defenses, particularly in light of the
unlikelihood of defeating the prosecution at early stages of criminal
proceedings.6 0 By thus correlating the differences between the ultimate
factual issues at a preliminary hearing and at trial with the concomitant
restriction imposed on the prudent defense attorney's cross-examination of
adverse witnesses at preliminary hearings, the court concluded that "where a
witness, who testified against the defendant at preliminary hearing and was
not cross-examined is later unavailable to testify at trial, the Sixth Amendment
precludes the State's use of the witness' recorded testimony, notwithstanding
R.C. 2945.49."' 1
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on Barber, which it said "requires this
result."6 2 In explaining this reliance, however, the Roberts court referred only
to the decision's secondary holding: that a criminal defendant does not waive
his right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at trial by failing to cross-examine
issues" is a focal concern for the sixth amendment. Moreover, the Wigmore section contains a
discussion of the attributes of cross-examination which permit exceptions to the hearsay rule,
rather than to the Confrontation Clause. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court
stressed that, while there was overlap between the common law hearsay rules and the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause, neither was to be viewed as a codification of the other.
1 55 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 378 N.E.2d at 496.
56 Id.

Id.
58Id.
57

s1 See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
6055 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 378 N.E.2d at 496.
61Id. at 197, 378 N.E.2d at 496.
62

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss3/5
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them at the preliminary hearing. 3 The court's reliance on this aspect of Barber
seems inapposite. The opinion does not indicate any assertion by the State that
Roberts has waived his Confrontation Clause rights by failing to crossexamine Anita Isaacs at the preliminary hearing. It is clear that the issue in
Roberts involved solely the issue of compliance with the sixth amendment's
requirements by the State, and not the issue of respondent's waiver of any
constitutional rights.
The court's arguably erroneous reliance on Barbermay have resulted from
a misapprehension of the major issues which traditionally appear in cases
involving conflicts between the use of preliminary hearing testimony at trial
and the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court has promulgated an
exception to strict compliance with the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause when guarantees for the reliability of non-trial testimonial evidence
are present.64 Barber, however, involved a collateral situation because the
Court found that no necessity existed under the facts to warrant an exception
from strict compliance with the Confrontation Clause.6 5
Thus, Barber is of little relevance to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
in Roberts, for in Roberts there was a need to develop an exception to strict
compliance with the Confrontation Clause because the court found that Anita
Isaacs was unavailable for trial. In holding that Robert's sixth amendment
rights had been violated, the court relied on the result in Barber,i.e., reversal
of a state conviction premised on a failure to strictly comply with the
Confrontation Clause, together with the Barber Court's discussion of the
minor issue of waiver of Confrontation Clause rights. Had the Ohio Supreme
Court correctly understood the issues involved when use of preliminary
hearing testimony conflicts with the Confrontation Clause, it would have
determined that the discussion of waiver in Barber was irrelevant to the
ultimate decision in Roberts. As noted in Justice Celebreeze's dissenting
opinion, Barber suggests that a contrary result should have been reached
when deciding Roberts under the federal Constitution. 6
6 The major holding of Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), is that the preliminary hearing
testimony of a witness cannot be admitted at trial unless the State makes a good faith effort to
produce the witness and the witness is actually unavailable. See note 30 supra and accompanying
text.
6 See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
6 The state in Barber was attempting to invoke a traditionally recognized exception to the
Confrontation Clause which permits the introduction of the testimony of a witness who was
subject to cross-examination at a prior judicial proceeding but was unavailable to testify at a
second proceeding. 390 U.S. at 722. The Barber court held that the state could not invoke this
exception because under the facts of the case, the witness could not be considered unavailable.
The holding did not involve the use of preliminary hearing testimony where a witness was
legitimately unavailable.
66 55 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 378 N.E.2d at 497 (Celebreeze, J., dissenting). The Ohio Supreme
Court's misapplication of the Barbercase becomes even more apparent when the post-Roberts
decision of State v. Smith, 58 Ohio St. 2d 344, 390 N.E.2d 778 (1979) is examined. In Smith,
preliminary hearing testimony was excluded notwithstanding a cursory cross-examination of the
witness at that proceeding, with the court holding that when a witness is unavailable at trial,
preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if defense counsel had engaged in a "meaningful
cross examination" at the first proceeding. Id. at 347, 390 N.E.2d at 780. The major distinction
between the Roberts and Smith cases is that in Roberts, the conviction was reversed despite a
finding that the State has met its burden of proving the unavailability of the witness, as is required
in Barber. In Smith, the "Roberts rule" was used in conjunction with a finding that the State had
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Following its consideration of Barber, the Roberts majority attempted to
distinguish California v. Green17 It recognized that much of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Green was dictum and that the facts did not fully coincide
with the standards enunciated therein. Due to these facts, the Roberts
majority concluded that Green "goes no further than to suggest that crossexamination actually conducted may afford adequate confrontation for
purposes of a later trial."68 The Ohio court's analysis of Green may be an
overly restrictive interpretation of the import of that decision. In Green, the
Supreme Court attempted to establish standards for evaluating compliance
with the sixth amendment in situations where the prosecution is unable to
afford a criminal defendant the opportunity to confront an adverse witness at
trial. Even though the Green standards were enunciated in dictum, they are
the only Supreme Court guidelines presently available to state courts for
determining if criminal proceedings comply with the Confrontation Clause. 9
When reviewing the Roberts opinion, a conscientious Ohio prosecutor
might well voice a serious criticism of its result, a criticism which is equally
applicable to the Supreme Court opinions in Pointer, Barber, and, to an
extent, Green. While these decisions inform a prosecutor of several
circumstances where use of preliminary hearing testimony at trial violates the
Confrontation Clause, none of the decisions provides concise guidelines for
avoiding sixth amendment problems. In other words, what is missing from
Roberts, Pointer,Barber and Green is a clear delineation of sixth amendment
requirements for use of a transcript of the preliminary hearing testimony of an
70
unavailable witness at trial.
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE RATIONALE FOR

Roberts

While the result in Roberts seems out of line with recent Supreme Court
decisions on Confrontation Clause requirements and, further, shares with
these decisions the shortcoming of failing to provide adequate guidance to
failed to establish the witness' unavailability at trial. Id. at 349,390 N.E.2d at781. In other words,
the holding in Smith could have easily been supported by the finding that the State failed to meet
the burden imposed on it in Barber.
67 399 U.S. 149 (1970); see notes 36-45 supra and accompanying text.
6o55 Ohio St. 2d at 199,378 N.E.2d at497; see generallyGraham, The Rights of Confrontation
and Rules of Evidence: Sir Walter Raleigh Rides Again, 9 ALASKA L.J. 3 (1971), in which the author
lists a series of positions which may find support in Green. One such position is that a witness must
be actually cross-examined at a preliminary hearing before this testimony will be admissible in a
trial in which the declarant is legitimately unavailable. But the author notes: "The opinion is
unclear on this point. At one place it speaks of 'opportunity to cross-examine' and at others the
Court is at pains to point out that cross-examination was conducted without any apparent
limitations." Id. at 21 n.89.
6 The Roberts court's refusal to recognize and adhere to the standards set forth in Green is
probably best explainable as self-serving. The majority's only concession to Green appears to be
its self-imposed limitation on its holding, 55 Ohio St. 2d at 198-99, 378 N.E.2d at 497, leaving
unanswered the question of whether actual cross-examination at a preliminary hearing will,
under proper circumstances, satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
70 Perhaps it is unfair to group the Green decision with the others, because it certainly reflects
an effort by the United States Supreme Court to lay down such standards. However, as has been
previously noted, see notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text, Green is not a strong precedent in
this regard because of its susceptibility to charges that it represents mere dictum and because it is
easily distinguishable on its facts from other potential fact patterns more closely concerned with
developing exceptions to strict compliance with traditional Confrontation Clause requirements.
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prosecutors, both of these problems would have been alleviated if the Ohio
Supreme Court had adopted alternate reasoning. The majority opinion in
Roberts persuasively exposed significant differences between preliminary
hearings and trials which affect the decision of defense counsel to crossexamine at the earlier hearing. However, a close analysis of the Supreme
Court decisions may have prevented the majority in Roberts from relying
upon this observation to find a violation of the sixth amendment of the United
71
States Constitution.
In finding that either actual cross-examination at a preliminary hearing or
cross-examination at trial would satisfy the sixth amendment in Ohio criminal
proceedings, the majority in Roberts could have construed Article I, Section
10 of the Ohio Constitution to require this result.72 Article I, Section 10
contains the Ohio counterpart to the Confrontation Clause of the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution. While requiring that criminal
defendants "meet witnesses face to face," Article I, Section 10 does provide
that deposition testimony of an absent witness may be used against an accused
at trial if the accused had the means and opportunity to be present with
counsel at the taking of the deposition and to examine the witness "face to face
as fully and in the same manner as if in court. . . ...
7 Article I, Section 10 does
not, however, expressly authorize the use at trial of preliminary hearing
testimony from unavailable witnesses, although the legislature has attempted
to provide for the introduction of such testimony in section 2945.49 of the
Revised Code.7 4 While the question has been addressed by a court of
appeals,7 5 the issue of a constitutional conflict between Ohio Revised Code
section 2945.49 and Article I, Section 10 would be one of first impression in the
Ohio Supreme Court. In light of the concerns expressed by the court in
Roberts, there would seem to be no reason why its result could not have rested
upon a liberal interpretation of Article I, Section 10, simply giving due process rights to a criminal defendant in addition to those established by the
United States Constitution.
Further, by resting its decision on an interpretation of Article I, Section 10,
rather than on the Confrontation Clause, the court could have drawn to the
attention of the state prosecutors the use of criminal depositions, expressly
authorized by Article I, Section 10, and currently provided for in Rule 15 of
71 See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
72 OHIo CONST. art.

I, § 10 provides:

In any trial, in any court the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person with counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and
to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face . . . ; but provision may be
made by law for the taking of the deposition by the accused or by the state, to be used
for or against the accused, of any witness whose attendance cannot be had at trial,
always securing to the accused means and the opportunity to be presentin person and
with counsel at the taking of such deposition, and to examine the witness face to face as
fully and in the same manner as if in court
(emphasis added).
73Id.
7 See note 2 supra.
7 See Mitchell v. State, 40 Ohio App. 367, 178 N.E. 325 (1931) (statute authorizing use of
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness held constitutional under Article I, § 10
of the Ohio Constitution).
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the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure. 76 While resort to taking criminal
depositions may not always be as convenient or as feasible as the recordation
of witness testimony at preliminary hearings, it may present a viable method
of avoiding the ultimate result in Roberts in many cases where the prosecutor
has cause to believe that an important witness may not be available at trial.
By interpreting Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution as prohibiting the Legislature from enacting such legislation as Ohio Revised Code
section 2545.49, the court in Roberts could have embraced the reasoning of
Justice Brennan in his Green dissent 77 and further pointed Ohio prosecutors in
a different direction with respect to coping with the problem of unavailable
witnesses at trial.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider the
constitutional validity of the decision in State v. Roberts.78 It would appear
that the time has come for a decisive opinion which will resolve the conflict
between the use of preliminary hearing testimony at trial and the
Confrontation Clause and which will allow the use of such testimony of
unavailable witnesses at trial when the defendant received adequate counsel
at the preliminary hearing. However, in light of the foregoing analysis of the
Roberts decision, it appears likely that the United States Supreme Court will
vacate the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts, as it did with the
California Supreme Court's decision in Green, and remand the case for
further proceedings. Perhaps at that point the Ohio Supreme Court will
attempt to again reverse the trial court's judgment, utilizing the approach
suggested within this note.
ROBERT A. BOYD
7 A part or all of a deposition may be used if the witness is dead, out-of-state, unable to attend
due to sickness or infirmity, or if the party offering the deposition is unable to procure attendance
of the witness by issuing a subpoena. Omo R. CriM. P. 15(F); see State v. Court of Common Pleas,
9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967) (statute authorizing the taking of depositions in criminal
cases held constitutional).
" 399 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78 99 S. Ct. 1990 (1979).
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